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Throughout the decade of the 1970's, a
complex system of Federal controls governed
prices for domestically-produced crude oil.
Those controls held the average price of
domestically-produced crude below the world
market level. Consequently, controls tended
to reduce production substantially below the
level that would otherwise have prevailed,
aggravating a decade-long downtrend in U.S.
crude-oil production.
For any given level of refiners' crude-oil
demand, the reduction in domestic production
raised imported-oil requirements by an
equivalent amount. Moreover, that added
import volume involved greater resource costs
than would have been required through
domestic production. As a result, controls
worked against the nation's goal of energy
independence and led to an inefficient alloca-
tion of resources.
Despite President Reagan's January 1981
lifting of controls on domestically-produced
crude, producers still are not realizing the
world price. The Windfall Profit Tax - which
went into effect March 1, 1980 and could
extend through 1990 - has been returning to
the Federal government much of the added
revenue that otherwise would have accrued to
producers through decontrol. With the tax,
producers are realizing less than the world
market price,. although of course more than
they would have realized with continued con-
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trois. Thus, with the tax, future domestic pro-
duction will be lower than it otherwise would
have been with decontrol and no tax, although
higher than with continued controls. Similarly,
imports will be higher than otherwise, and the
misallocation of resources will continue.
Section I presents a simple model ofthe sup-
ply of domestically-produced crude oil which
shows how supply responds positively to prices
received by producers. It also shows that, in
the absence of controls, domestic crude oil
would sell at approximately the world price
because domestic producers operate in a world
market. Section II describes the major features
of the crude-oil price-control program con-
tained in the recently terminated Energy
Policy and Conservation Act of1975. That sec-
tion shows how that program held the average
domestic price below the world market price,
and thus kept domestic output below the
amount that would have been produced in a
free market. Section III outlines the major pro-
visions of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of
1980. It shows how the tax leaves the price
realized by producers still below the world
, reducing the positive impact of
decontrol on domestic crude-oil production.
Finally, Section IV presents a range of esti-
mates of the domestic production losses that
resulted from the Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Act, and that potentially could result over
the next decade from the Windfall Profit Tax.
The recently-passed Reagan tax program con-
tains minor changes in the windfall-profit tax,
but these do not materially affect the conclu-
sions of this paper.I. Domestic Oil Production in a Free Market
Domestic crude-oil production can be
increased over the long-run in a number of
ways, all of which are encouraged by a rise in
selling price. "Long-run" means a planning
period long enough to permit producers to
invest in new productive capacity to achieve
higher production rates. In crude-oil produc-
tion, new productive capacity can be installed
either at existing (i.e., already-producing) pro-
perties orat entirely new sites. I
At existing properties, producers can
increase the rate ofextraction by drilling more
development wells. Alternatively, they can
invest in enhanced oil-recovery technologies.
This involves drilling service wells through
which steam, chemicals, or gases may be
injected to increase well pressure, thus raising
the recoverable proportion of the total reser-
voir.
In addition, producers can expand produc-
tion through the discovery of new properties
- reservoirs in unproven regions as well as
near already-producing areas. But first, pro-
ducers must do some exploratory drilling and
identify resources that are recoverable under
current economic and technological condi-
tions.
The addition ofdevelopment wells at known
reservoirs permits a higher rate of extraction
from a given deposit, but it does not increase
the ultimate, or total cumulative, production
potential. 2. This potential can be expanded
only through an increase in proved reserves,
resulting from investments in enhanced oil-
recovery technologies and the discovery of
new economic resources. "Proved reserves"
refer to the portion of the resource base that
has been identified and explored, and from
which crude oil can be recovered profitably at
current prices and with current technology. J
While the occurrence of oil is finite, being
governed by geology, a host ofother factors -
economic, technological, environmental and
political - determine the rate at which oil
resources are discovered, developed and trans-
ferred to the category of reserves.
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Long-run Supply Model
Building upon this foundation, we can
further clarify the concept ofthe long-run sup-
ply schedule for representative individual pro-
perties, the domestic crude-oil producing
industry and the combined domestic and
import sectors through Charts lA-C. The
charts show, at a particular period in time, the
quantity of crude oil that will be available to
the U.5. market from those various sources at
various selling prices. We assume, throughout
the analysis, that the crude-oil producing
industry is workably competitive, in line with
the bulk of the evidence presented in the
recent academic literature. With regard to
structure, the producing and refining sectors
ofthe industry are clearly different. Thousands
of U.5. firms are engaged in the exploration
and extraction ofcrude oil, with no firm domi-
nant - in contrast to the oligopolistic refining
sector ofthe industry.4
Chart 1A shows the long-run supply
schedule for the representative individual pro-
perty. This is the long-run marginal cost curve
(MC) - the addition to total cost resulting
from the last unit ofoutput. The marginal cost
of producing additional barrels from a given
reservoir increases because firms must invest
in higher-cost recovery techniques, such as
enhanced oil-recovery methods and deeper
development wells, as more oil is extracted
from a finite reservoir. In a competitive
market, each firm maximizes profit by expand-
ing output to the point where marginal cost
equals price. The schedule is upward sloping;
as the price rises, it pays firms to the
higher-cost barrels that would have been
uneconomic to produce at a lower price.
Chart lB shows the long-run supply
schedule, 5 0 5 0 , for the entire domestic crude-
oil producing industry. That schedule is
derived by summing the amounts produced by
all properties at each price - that is, summing
horizontally the marginal cost-output curves
for all producing properties. Again, the
schedule is upward sloping because, withChart 1
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8increased production, firms must locate,
develop and extract oil from less accessible and
poorerquality resources. 5
Chart lC shows the long-run supply
schedule for domestic and foreign oil available
to U.S. refiners at various selling prices. At
prices below the world price, Pw, the supply
comes entirely from domestic sources. The
price cannot exceed Pw , since imports are
available essentially without limit at that price.
Hence, the total supply schedule is repre-
sented by the kinked curve, So as. Schedule
DD meanwhile represents U.S. refiners'
crude-oil demand schedule. In the absence of
price controls, domestic crude oil would sell at
approximately the world price, Pw - the
landed price for imported oil. 6 This is because
U.S. producers operate in a world market. At
the world price, domestic production cannot
meet the total quantity demanded by U.S.
refiners. The price of imported crude thus
represents the marginal cost of an additional
barrel - and thus determines the marginal
domestic producer price. At the world price -
the domestic price that would prevail without
controls - domestic producers would be will-
ing to supply Qw barrels. Domestic demand
would be QD, and imports in the amount of
QD-Qwwould be required.
Efficiency in the allocation of resources
requires that the total cost of satisfying any
given quantity demanded be as low as possi-
ble. 1 When the alternative to domestic oil is
imported oil purchased at the world price, effi-
ciency requires that production from all
domestic properties be expanded to the point
where the marginal cost ofthe last unit ofout-
put is equal to the price of imported oil.
Beyond that point, resources could be saved by
reducing domestic output and replacing that
output with imported oil. But below that point,
where the cost of the last barrel produced is
less than the price of imported oil, resources
could be saved by reducing imports and
expanding domestic production.
Since the supply schedule So So reflects the
marginal cost of producing domestic oil, the
uncontrolled market solution for domestic and
foreign supply, So as, represents an efficient
allocation of resources. In this allocation, the
marginal cost of production for all domestic
producers is equal to the world price. There is
no opportunity to reduce total cost by shifting
supply between domestic and foreign sources.
II. Domestic Oil Production Under Price Controls
The Federal price-control programs of the
1970's held the average selling price of
domestically-produced crude below the world
market price, and thereby disturbed the effi-
cient free-market solution. But government
attempts to influence domestic prices first
developed in the 1930's - although their pur-
pose was to hold the producer price above
(rather than below) the competitive level.
During the 1930's, oil producing states
instituted "conservation" programs - osten-
sibly to prevent "wasteful" production prac-
tices, but in reality, to keep prices high by
limiting production.8 Those programs were
effective until the mid-1950's, when increas-
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ing quantities offoreign oil became available at
prices well below the average domestic pro-
ducer price. After trying (unsuccessfully) to
restrict imports voluntarily, the Federal
government in 1959 introduced a program of
mandatory import quotas, using national
security as justification.
The early 1970's witnessed a fundamental
change in the nation's demand for imports.
Despite the quota system, domestic crude-oil
production peaked by 1970, as import com-
petition prevented the domestic price from ris-
ing as fast as production costs. By 1973, U.S.
petroleum consumption had outgrown
domestic production, and imported oil hadbecome the required source of marginal sup-
plies. The marginal cost of imported oil, i.e.,
the world price, thus became the determinant
of the domestic producer price.
Energy Policy and Conservation Act
The Federal government first placed direct
controls on prices of domestic crude oil on
August 15, 1971, when President Nixon froze
wages and prices throughout the economy. 9 A
multi-tier pricing system evolved in Phase IV
of the controls program, announced in August
1973, and in the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act, passed in November 1973 dur-
ing the Arab oil embargo. These then led to
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of
1975 (EPCA). That legislation controlled
domestic producer selling prices on a property-
by-property basis, with production above and
below the "base production control level"
(BPCL) -the 1975 average monthly produc-
tion - subject to different price ceilings.
Under the act, "lower-tier" oil referred to out-
put at or below the BPCL, while "upper-tier"
oil referred to output in excess of this base
level or output from new properties brought
into production after 1975.
The law stipulated a lower price ceiling for
lower-tier oil than for upper-tier oil, and stipu-
lated that ceilings would be set to achieve a
target average price for domestic oil. That price
could rise to reflect inflation, but by no more
than 10 percent annually. 10 Initially, the law
classified oil from "stripper" properties -
those producing ten barrels or less daily - as
upper-tier oil. But in September 1976, the
energy agency decontrolled stripper oil and thus
permitted it to receive the world market price.
Policymakers designed the control program
to hold the average price of domestically-pro-
duced crude below the world market level, and
thereby protect consumers from the full
impact of sharply rising world prices - in
effect, transfering to consumers much of the
added income that would otherwise have
accrued to producers. II At the same time,
policymakers sought, through the multi-tier
system, to accomplish that objective with the
least possible reduction in production incen-
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tives.Since decisions to expand production are
determinedon the margin, they permitted pro-
duction in excess ofthe base level to receive a
higher ceiling price. In that way, they hoped to
provide sufficient incentive to stimulate pro-
duction. But they also wanted to prevent
owners ofwells brought into production before
the OPEC price run-up from receiving profits
far higher than originally anticipated and so
held the lower-tier price not only below the
world level but the upper-tier price. In this
view, the removal of such unanticipated prof-
its - "windfalls" - would have little impact
on production decisions. (A similar philosophy
apparently underlies the new Windfall Profit
Tax.) Nevertheless, because controls generally
held the price at the margin below the world
price, production was less than it otherwise
would have been.
Charts 2A-C illustrate the price and produc-
tion effects ofthe Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Act for representative properties and the
entire domestic industry. 12 Properties in exis-
tence before 1975 faced the marginal revenue
(MR) schedule shown in Chart 2A. Output of
q, or less qualified as stripper oil and received
the uncontrolled (world) price, Pw. Output
from qs to the base production control level
(BPCL) received the lower-tier price, PL' Out-
put in excess ofBPCL received the upper-tier
price, Pu. "New" properties - those brought
into production after 1975 - faced the
marginal revenue schedule shown in Chart 2B,
and except for small stripper properties,
received the upper-tier price.
Existing stripper properties were unaffected
by this system of price controls. Those proper-
ties received the world price, with or without
controls, and hence production remained the
same at q,. But for other existing properties,
production was lower than it would have been
without controls, since production was not
permitted to receive the world price. The mag-
nitude of the impact depended on whether
costs had risen since the 1975 base year.
Producers not incurring higher costs would
have found it profitable to expand production
past the base-period level, to earn the upper-
tier price on the new production. ProductionPrir.e
(dollars
per barrel)
B. INDIVIDUAL DOMESTIC PROPERTY
(New)
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11still would have been lower than it would have
been without controls, however, since the
upper-tier price was below Pw. Producers
incurring higher costs than faced in 1975
would have fared less well. (See the marginal
cost schedule, MC I> in Chart 2A.) For those
properties, producers would not have found it
profitable to expand production beyond the
base-period level. The new production up to
the base level would earn only P b the lower-
tier price, which would be below the cost of
producing it. The profit earned on upper-tier
oil (shaded area) would not cover the loss
incurred on lower-tier oil (striped area) and
the firm would choose to remain producing at
ql' Producers incurring an extremely sharp rise
in costs since 1975 would have an incentive to
actually lower production to 10 barrels or less
per day, to qualify for the uncontrolled price
afforded strtpper properties.
Producers with new properties would have
found less incentive to produce than in a situa-
tion with no controls (Chart 2B). When the
world price was Pw, output from new proper-
ties was only qu because they were permitted
to receive only the price Pu. Had price controls
not existed, output on new properties would
have been qw, because that output would have
received the world price.
At the industry level, this system of con-
trols, like its predecessors, tended to hold the
average domestic producer price below the
world market level, thereby reducing produc-
tion below the level that would otherwise have
prevailed (Chart 2C). When the world price is
Pw, controls hold the average domestic pro-
ducer price at Pc. As a result, the domestic
industry produces only Qcinstead ofthe quan-
tity Qw produced in the absence of controls.
For a given level ofrefinery crude oil demand,
the consequent reduction in domestic output
is offset entirely by imports. Thus the control
program tended to increase the nation's de-
pendence on foreign oil.
The control program also led to inefficiency
in the allocation of resources. Between output
levels Qc and Qw, each additional barrel of
crude could be produced domestically at a cost
below the world price, and thus at a smaller
12
expenditure ofresources than for imported oil.
Area dca, which equals the difference between
the world price and the domestic supply
schedule SoSo at each increment between Qc
and Qw, represents resources wasted on
expenditures for imported oil because of con-
trois. 1]
Intertemporal Production Decisions
Thus far, we have considered the effects of
controls only in a static framework. We have
assumed that firms consider only the current
price, without regard to price expectations,
when making production decisions. Also, we
have ignored the potential effects of the cur-
rent level of output on future production. We
have assumed that firms could obtain optimal
production and profit paths over time by pro-
ducing at the point where marginal cost equals
price in each planning period.
But there is an importantdifference between
the marginal-cost (supply) schedule of a typi-
cal manufacturing firm and the schedule of a
firm extracting an exhaustible resource such as
petroleum. As petroleum is removed from a
reservoir, the pressure of the reservoir de-
clines, and so too does the total amount of
petroleum available - a tendency known as
the "natural decline function." Because of the
exhaustible nature of the resource, a barrel of
oil produced today will not be available in
some future period. Petroleum producers thus
face an additional cost ofproduction not incur-
red by manufacturers. That additional cost -
the user cost - is the opportunity cost or profit
foregone of being unable to sell that unit of
output in the future.
In order for a producer to decide to produce
a barrel of oil in the present, the price ofeach
additional barrel ofoil produced today must be
sufficient to cover this opportunity cost as well
as normal production costs. Moreover, in view
ofthe effect ofcurrent output on future output
- the "natural decline" problem - the firm
cannot simply select the output level in each
period where marginal revenue equals
marginal cost (defined to include user cost).
Instead, the firm must maximize a stream of
profits over time, which involves a discountingprocedure. This present-value analysis, in
effect, states that for production of an addi-
tional barrel to take place, the present profit
invested at the market rate ofinterest must at
least be equal to the profit from selling that
barrel any time in the future. 14
By affecting price expectations, the controls
program may have exerted still another
restraining effect on current production. Ifthe
expected path of future prices rises, the user
cost increases and producers can expand prof-
its by deferring current production to the
future. In this case, the present value of the
future profit would exceed today's profit. Con-
troIs on current prices may have created just
such an expectation of higher prices in the
future when controls eventually might be
lifted. The expected price path in moving from
control to decontrol would have been steeper
than had prices never been subject to controls.
As a result, controls may have raised the user
cost of controlled oil, thereby causing pro-
ducers to restrict current production even
more than they would have done because of
receiving less than the world-market price.
This was especially true ofthe 1978-80 period,
when market participants widely expected
eventual decontrol. 15
III. Domestic Oil Production Under "Decontrol"
On June 1, 1979, the Energy Department
began to implement a program, mandated by
President Carter, for decontrolling domestic
crude-oil prices by October 1, 1981. Under
that program, production that previously
would have been subject to the lower-tier price
was permitted to move gradually to the upper-
tier category. Then, beginning on January 1,
1980, production previously classified as
upper-tier oil, plus the lower-tier oil moving
into the upper-tier category, was permitted to
move to a free-market classification at a rate of
4.6 percent per month.
The Energy Department decontrolled oil
discovered after January 1, 1979 on June 1 of
that year, and it lifted controls on "heavy"
crude on August 17,1979. Finally, the Reagan
Administration - in its first major economic-
policy move - lifted all remaining price con-
trols on domestically produced crude on Janu-
ary 28, 1981.
In moving to decontrol domestic prices,
both the Carter and Reagan Administrations
hoped to encourage domestic production and
to slow down the growth of U.S. petroleum
consumption. To the extent that the higher
refiner costs for domestic crude were reflected
in higher refined-product prices, consumption
should be curtailed. 16
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Windfall Profit Tax
At the same time, Congress was unwilling to
permit producers to realize all the added
revenue that would accrue through decontrol,
especially since that step could boost producer
revenues by about $1 trillion over the 1980-90
period, according to estimates of the Joint
Committee on Taxation. 17 As a result, Con-
gress enacted the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax of 1980 to divert to the U.S. Treasury
some of the incremental revenues that would
otherwise be received by producers through
decontrol. The tax became effective March 1,
1980.
The tax is perhaps the largest ever imposed
on a single industry. Over the 1980-90 period,
the tax could yield about $236 billion, in addi-
tion to a $332-billion increase in corporate
income taxes resulting from decontrol. Thus,
the U.S. Treasury could receive $568 billion of
the projected $l-trillion additional industry
revenue received from decontrol. 18
Although called a tax on profit, the tax really
is a Federal excise tax on a portion ofthe sell-
ing price received from crude oil. The tax paid
per barrel is determined by applying various
tax rates to the "windfall profit" - the
difference between the decontrolled producer
price and the price that would have prevailedunder continued controls (less state severance
tax).
The tax rates and base prices applicable to
various properties vary according to type of
production and size ofproducer (Table 1). The
Internal Revenue Service established these
new oil categories for tax purposes. Producers
are classified either as "majors" or as "inde-
pendents" (producers with gross annual sales
of $5 million or less and with refining
capacities of no more than 50,000 barrels a
day). Identical tax rates are applied, except for
the first 1,000 barrels a day ofTier 1 and Tier 2
production by independents. To provide
greater incentive for certain investments, the
lowest tax rates apply to newly discovered and
incremental tertiary oil, the latter being oil
obtained through a qualified tertiary
(enhanced) recovery method, i.e., production
in excess of the projected decline rate for the
property without the tertiary technique. 19
In computing the tax, producers first
subtract a base price, adjusted for inflation,
from the decontrolied producer price (Appen-
dix A). Next they subtract a state severance
tax - estimated to average about 5.4 percent
of the selling price - to determine the
"windfall profit." Then they apply the
appropriate tax rate to determine the amount
of tax to be paid.
Table 1






Controlled oil discovered before 19792 70 50
Tier 2
Stripper well oil 60 30
National Petroleum reserve oil 60 30
Tier 3
Newly discovered oil 30 30





















1 The Windfall Profit Tax of 1980 was enacted into law on April 2, 1980. But the tax was retroactive, i.e., applicable to
crude-oil production removed from properties after February 29, 1980.
2 For purposes of the windfall-profit tax, the pricing categories conform to those in effect in May 1979, before the process
of gradual decontrol began.
3 The special reduced-tax rates afforded independent producers for Tiers I and 2 are applicable only to their first 1,000 bar-
rels per day of production. Production in excess of 1,000 bid is taxed at the regular windfall-profit tax rates, i.e., the rates
applicable to integrated producers.
4 Incremental tertrary oil is the amount of production from a property on which a producer uses a qualified tertiary
(enhanced) recovery method in excess ofthe projected decline rate if a tertiary technique had not been used on that pro-
perty.
5 Categories ofcrude exempt from the tax include: qualified governmental-interest oil, qualified charitable-interest oil, cer-
tain Indian oil, Alaskan oil (other than from the Sadlerochit reservoir) north ofthe Alaska-Aleutian mountain range and
over 75 miles from the pipeline, and tertiary oil from properties owned by independent producers.
6 Inflation is measured by the change in the Gross National Product deflator.
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Chart 3 shows how the windfall-profit tax
will affect U.S. crude oil production as long as
the uncontrolled domestic price remains above
the adjusted base price. 20 So So represents the
long-run supply schedule for the domestic
crude-oil producing industry. Decontrol with
no tax would provide producers with the max-
imum incentive to increase production, and
would lead to an efficient ailocation of
resources in meeting with the nation's
petroleum requirements. In this situation, pro-
ducers would realize the uncontrolled price,
Pw, and produce at output Qw. With con-
tinued controls, producers would realize price,
Pc, and supply Qc. The tax lowers the price
realized by producers below the free-market
price to an intermediate price, PT' Since the
uncontrolled domestic selling price is deter-
mined by the world price, producers must
absorb the tax as a reduction in realized price,
and cannot pass it on to consumers. The tax
thus reduces the incentive to increase produc-
tion provided by decontrol. At price, PT , quan-
tity QT is produced - more than would be pro-
duced with continued controls but less than
would be produced with decontrol and no tax.
Production is greater than with continued con-
trols because only part of the so-called
"windfall" is diverted to the U.S. Treasury.
IV. Estimating Production losses
Crude-oil production in the United States
dropped 10 percent over the 1970-79 period,
and would have dropped 24 percent except for
the addition of 1.4 million barrels per day of
Alaskan North Slope production. The decade-
long decline in production resulted inevitably
from a decline in the amount of oil added to
reserves annually, through new discoveries
and enhanced oil recovery, during the 1970-79
period compared with the decade of the
1960's. Unless gross annual additions to
reserves exceed the rate ofextraction, the total
inventory of proved reserves declines. Pro-
ducers were forced to lower production so as
not to experience an even greater run-down in
their proved reserve inventory. Even with a
cutback in production, proved reserves - the
industry's working "in the ground" inventory
- declined steadily over the 1970-79 period
from 39.0 to 27.1 billion barrels.
Even with controls, the average wellhead
price for domestically-produced crude rose
three-fold over the 1973-79 period (TapIe 2).
This price upsurge led to a reversal of the
prolonged decline in exploration activity that
had occurred over the preceding decade and a
half. Between 1973 and 1979, the total number
ofoil wells drilled nearly doubled, rising at an
average annual rate of 16 percent.
Nonetheless, additions to reserves still
dropped from an average annual rate of2.7 bil-
lion barrels during the 1965-69 period to 2.0
15billion barrels during the 1971-74 period, and
then to only 1.3 billion barrels during the
1975-78 period. The rate of reserve additions
only began to pick up, to 2.2 billion barrels,
with a new price upsurge during the period of
gradual decontrol in 1979.
Without price controls, drilling activity
would have increased somewhat faster, raising
annual additions to reserves as weB as produc-
tion at existing properties through develop-
ment drilling. How much did the controls -
more specifically the Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act - contribute to the decline in
production?
Energy Policy and Conservation Act
To answer that question, we could develop a
petroleum-supply model to project production
under an uncontrolled price assumption.
Then, that outcome could be compared with
actual production to estimate production
losses. Given the fact that the oil-supply pro-
cess involves several phases - exploration,
reservoir development, and production - the
development of such a model would be a vast
Table 2
Relationship Between Controlled Domestic Crude Oil Prices
and World Price, 1972·80
Average
Average Refiner Domestic Price:
Acquisition Price Average Domestic Price at Wellhead Controlled as Percent
Year Imported Crude' Without Controls (est.) With Controls of Uncontrolled
1972 3.22 3.39" 3.39 100.0
1973 4.08 3.89" 3.89 100.0
Old 011' New 011"
1974 12.52 11.66' 6.87 5.03 10.13 58.9
1975 13.93 12.95' 7.67 5.03 12.03 59.2
Lower-Tier Upper-Tier Stripper




1977 14.53 13.59" 8.57 5.19 11.22 13.59 6.35 12.34 63.1
1978 14.57 13.95" 9.00 5.46 12.15 13.95 5.22 12.85 64.5
1979 21.67 22.93" 12.64 5.95 13.20 22.93 10.57 19.40 55.1
1980 33.82 35.54'; 21.20 6.49 14.34 3554 14.14 3306 59.6
I Before entitlement benefit.
2 In 1972 and most of 1973, petroleum prices were subject to the Phase I-IV price provisions ofthe Economic Stabilization
Act. The average domestic wellhead price during that period did not differ substantially from the refiner acquisition cost
ofcrude, so it can be assumed that controls had little effect on domestic crude-oil prices. As a reSUlt, prices are assumed
to be the same with or without controls.
;i Estimated by excluding domestic producers' transportation costs from the refiner acquisition price for imported oil, the
adjustment being based on the post-1976 price ofstripper oil. This adjustment reflects the fact that the wellhead price for
stripper oil-deconlrolled in September 1976-represents an uncontrolled price for domestic oil exclusive of transporta-
tion costs.
4 Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act in effect throughout 1974 and 1975, "old" oil in any given month was
defined as the quantity produced from a given property in the corresponding month of 1972.
" Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, "new" oil was defined as any production in excess of output in the
same month of 1972.
" The post-1976 (decontrolled) stripper price was used as a proxy for the uncontrolled domestic producer price. Actually, in
1979 and 1980, stripper oil sold at a substantial premium above comparable-quality imported oil, due to tight worldwide
supply conditions and the willingness of refiners to pay a premium for security ofsupply.
Source: Uncontrolled domestic price at the wellhead estimated by author as described in footnote 3 above. Actual prices as
published by U.S. Department of Energy, Monthly Energy Review.
16undertaking. Instead, we have relied upon
already existing models to obtain long-run
price elasticities of supply upon which to esti-
mate the production losses resulting froJ1.l that
particular control program. Elasticity ofsupply
is a measure ofthe responsiveness ofthe quan-
tity supplied of a given product to an increase
in its price.
In the absence of controls, the average
wellhead prices of lower and upper-tier crude
oil would have risen from their respective con-
trolled levels to the world market level. 21 At
existing properties - those in operation
before 1975 - an increase in prices would
have: (1) raised investment in development
wells, thereby raising the rate of extraction
from proved reserves and (2) encouraged
greater investment in enhanced oil-recovery
methods, thereby increasing additions to
reserves through improved technology. An
increase in the upper-tier price also would
have encouraged more exploratory drilling,
leading to the discovery of more new reserves
at new properties.
This study attempts to estimate how much
extra production would have been forthcom-
ing had prices been allowed to rise to the world
price. It does so by drawing on outside esti-
mates of the elasticity of supply, the percen-
tage change in quantity supplied divided by the
percentage change in price. In estimating pro-
duction losses as a result ofcontrols, we calcu-
lated the percentage difference between the
uncontrolled and controlled prices in any given
year, multiplied that by the supply elasticity to
get the percentage change in output, and then
converted that percentage change to an
arithmetic change by multiplying it by the
existing quantity.
Recent studies by the Department ofEnergy
suggest a long-run price elasticity of about .2
for categories of production equivalent to
"existing properties."22 Numerous
econometric studies are available for deriving
elasticity estimates for new properties. These
studies relate price to additions to reserves
from new discoveries. The authors then
assume that a given increase in new reserves
leads to an equivalent percentage increase in
17
production, as we also have done here. 23 These
studies have yielded a wide range of elasticity
estimates - ranging from .3 to .8 - with the
variation perhaps due in part to the different
time periods involved. 24
Utilizing these published elasticity esti-
mates, we estimated production losses for the
1976-79 price-control period under several
different elasticity assumptions (Table 3). The
elasticity ofproduction from existing properties
was assumed to be .2 in each scenario.
However, the elasticities of production from
new properties ranged from .3 (low), to .5
(medium) to .8 (high assumption).
All these elasticity estimates pertain to the
long-run. They show how production even-
tually might respond to a given change in price
after time had elapsed for exploration and
development. In our estimates, however, we
have recorded the response as if it shows up
fully within a year. For example, the estimated
production losses for 1976 represent the addi-
tional production that would be forthcoming in
the long-run as a result ofclosing the differen-
tials between controlled and uncontrolled
prices prevailing during that year. Although
recorded for that single year, in reality the pro-
duction response would take considerably
longer.
The results indicate a substantial lowering of
production by controls in the 1976-79 period,
under all scenarios (Table 3). The likeliest out-
come would probably arise from the low-
response assumption, because elasticity of
supply would surely fall in the wake of a sub-
stantial widening of price differentials. Under
this low-response scenario, production with
uncontrolled prices eventually could have
been 10 percent higher in 1976, and 29 percent
higher in 1979, than actual production with
controlled prices. The comparable production
increases under the high-response scenario
would have been 15 percent in 1976 and 73
percent in 1979 - although the underlying
elasticity estimates in that scenario appear to
be unrealistically high. The limited nature of
the resource base, and the further depletion in
recent years, would preclude the likelihood of
very high supply elasticities - .8 for new dis-Table 3
Domestic Crude Oil Production Losses Underthe Energy Policy and Conservation Act,
1976-79
(Production in millions of barrels)
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, Annual averages; producer prices at the wellhead.
, For an explanation of the derivation of this price series, see Table 2.
:j Derived by the author on the basis ofthree separate assumptions regarding price elasticity ofsupply for new properties.
Each response is assumed to become fully effective within a single year, although in reality, the production response to
closing any given differential between controlled and uncontrolled prices would take more than a year.
1 Elasticity figures for existing properties are .2 in all cases; for new properties .3 for low response, .5 for medium response,
and .8 for high response.
Source: Price and actual production data: U.S. Department of Energy, Monthly Energy Review. Estimated production losses
computed by author using methodology described in text.
18coveries - included in that scenario. 25
In all scenarios, the potential losses with
controls would have been very large on the
basis of 1979 prices because of the huge
increase estimated for wellhead prices in the
absence of controls. The average refiner
acquisition price for imported crude (before
entitlements) rose by only 41f2 percent over the
entire 1975-78 period, but then jumped 49
percent within 1979 alone (Table 2), as OPEC
members sharply boosted prices in the wake of
the cutoffof Iranian exports and consequent
world-wide tightening ofsupplies. The average
domestic wellhead price without controls -
the average refiner acquisition price for
imported crude less transportation costs from
domestic wells to refineries - thus would
have risen about 58 percent in 1979. Indeed,
that wellhead price probably would have risen
even more, because ofrefiners' willingness to
pay a premium for domestic oil for security of
supply. In this situation, controlled prices of
lower-tier and upper-tier oil would have been
only 17 and 39 percent, respectively, of the
estimated uncontrolled price for domestic oil.
Windfall Profit Tax
The windfall profit tax will dilute the
stimulus to increased production provided by
decontrol. The amount ofdilution will depend
principally upon the future behavior of the
uncontrolled domestic-producer selling price
- and thus the after-tax realized price - and
upon the production response to any given
increase in realized price.
Based upon an assumed 2 percent "real"
average annual increase in the uncontrolled
domestic producer selling price over the 1980-
90 period, we have developed different sets of
estimates of the offsetting effect of the
windfall-profit tax on the positive production
response from decontrol for the years 1985
and 1990. 26 This involves the development of
three alternative policy assumptions: (l)
Scenario I, continued price controls; (2)
Scenario II, decontrol with no windfall-profit
tax, and (3) Scenario III, decontrol with a
windfall-profit tax. As before, we have
assumed a lower elasticity of supply for oil
from existing properties - Tiers 1 and 2, as
well as heavy oil and incremental tertiary oil -
Table 4
Estimated Domestic Producer Oil Prices, 1985 and 1990,
Under Three Alternative Policy Assumptions!
Scenario I Scenario II Scenario III
Prices with Decontrol but Prices with Decontrol and
Year Prices with Continued Controls' No Windfall Profit Tax" Windfall Profit Tax'
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
1985 19.92 23.64 28.23 53.93 29.57 35.10 45.25
1990 26.78 31.77 41.92 79.84 41.84 49.96 67.03
I Annual averages in dollars per barrel; producer sales prices.
2 For 1985 and 1990, prices with controls were estimated by making inflation adjustments to the base prices for each tier (as
defined in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of1980, Table O. For 1980, the adjustment factors were based on the GNP
deflator. Thereafter, the inflation rate was assumed to decline gradually, reaching a 6.0-percent annual rate by mid-1986
and remaining at that rate through 1990. For Tier 3, the base price was adjusted upward by an additional 2 percent each
year, as allowed in the law.
:J The author estimated that domestic oil, without controls, would have sold for $35/barrel in the fourth quarter of 1980.
For 1985 and 1990, the decontrolled price was estimated by adjusting the 1980 price to reflect inflation plus an assumed 2-
percent annual increase. Theanticipated price ofheavy oil in 1980 was assumed to be $7.50 less than the average domestic
price, reflecting the traditional price differential.
4 The author assumed that the windfall profit tax effectively reduces the selling price actually realized by domestic pro-
ducers. For a description ofthe derivation ofthese prices, see Appendix A. The tiers represent the categories ofdomestic
oil as defined by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax of 1980, as shown in Table 1.
19than for oil from newly discovered properties.
And again, we have assumed a range of
elasticities for Tier 3 newly-discovered oil,
ranging from .3 (low), to .5 (medium) to .8
(high assumption).
To develop production estimates, we first
estimate producer prices under each of the
three scenarios (Table 4), making the esti-
mates in nominal terms to conform with the
actual computation of the windfall-profit tax.
The tax affects production in any given period
through its impact on the realized relative
price of oil compared with what it would be
without the tax.
Under continued controls (Scenario I), we
calculate prices for Tier 1 and Tier 2 oil for the
years 1985 and 1990 as equal to certain base
prices (defined by the Windfall Profit Tax)
Table 5: Estimated Domestic Crude Oil Production, 1985
Scenario I Scenario II
Production with Production with Decontrol but
Continued No Windfall Profit Tax'
Low Response' Price
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Total" Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Total"
1979 (Actual) 2,046 500 97 3,113 U) U) (.3)
1985 730 536 907 2,748 891 632 1,530 3,628
1990 318 637 1,035 2,464 396 766 1,611 3,248
Medium Response'
1979 (Actual) 2,046 500 97 3,113 U) U) (.5)
1985 730 536 907 2,748 891 632 2,094 4,192
1990 318 637 1,035 2,464 396 766 2,112 3,749
High Response'
1979 (Actual) 2,046 500 97 3,113 U) U) (.8)
1985 730 536 907 2,748 891 632 2,993 5,091
1990 318 637 1,035 2,464 396 766 2,912 4,549
I In millions of barrels.
2 Low, medium and high responses refer to the assumed elasticities of supply for various categories of crude. Tier 1 and
Tier 2 oil, as well as heavy oil and incremental tertiary (enhanced) oil in Tier 3, were assumed to be oil from existing pro-
perties. Oil from new properties appears in Tier 3. In each response case, oil from existing properties (Tiers 1and 2 and
heavy oil and incremental tertiary oil in Tier 3) was assumed to have a price elasticity of.2. The elasticity for new proper-
ties (Tier 3) varied from .3 in the low case to .5 in the medium case and .8 in the high case.
:J Assumes domestic oil prices behave as described in Table 4, Scenario I, with a continuation ofthe controls embodied in
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. Production estimates for the years 1985 and 1990 under this assumption are
from the Congressional Budget Office study cited below, page 76. These production estimates were used to derive our
Scenarios II and III.
4 Assumes domestic oil prices behave as described in Table 4, Scenario II. Production was estimated on the basis ofthe
same supply elasticities utilized in estimating producing losses under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.
20adjusted by inflation (measured by the GNP
deflator). The Tier 3 inflation adjustment
equals the inflation rate plus 2 percent
annually, as specified in the law. 27 Thus, in this
scenario, prices for Tier 1 and Tier 2 produc-
tion remain constant in real terms, while the
price for Tier 3 production rises at a 2-percent
real annual rate. Under decontrol (Scenario
II), we estimate the free market price by apply-
ing the inflation-plus-2-percent adjustment to
the uncontrolled stripper price ($35 a barreD
in the fourth quarter of 1980. (We use the
same methodology, although a higher base
price, as the Joint Committee on Taxation
uses in estimating windfall-profit tax
revenue.) 28 Under decontrol and the tax
(Scenario III) we calculate the realized pro-
ducer price by adding the extra after-tax
and 1990, Under Three Alternative Policy Assumptions]
Scenario III
Percent Increase Production with Decontrol and Percent Increase In
in Total Production Windfall Profit Tax' Total Production
Due to DecontroF Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Total" After Tax'
(.2) (.2) (.3)
32.0 790 580 1,314 3,259 18.6































r, Assumes domestic oil prices behave as described in Table 4, Scenario Ill.
,; Alaskan oil from proved reserves has been included in the production totals, but not in any tier. The author estimated
this Alaskan production at 575 and 475 million barrels in 1985 and 1990, respectively, compared with 471 million barrels
in 1979.
7 This refers to the amount (percent) by which total production without controls (Scenario ll) would exceed total produc-
tion with continued controls (Scenario nduring the years 1985 and 1990, respectively.
, This refers to the amount (percent) by which total production without price controls but with the windfall profits tax
(Scenario III) would exceed total production with continued controls (Scenario I) during the years 1985 and 1990, respec-
tively.
Source: Production estimates in Scenario I, Congressional Budget Office, The Windfall Profits Tax: A Comparative Ana(ysis of
Two Bills. 1979. All other estimates by the author.
21revenue per barrel to the estimated price
under continued controls (Appendix A).
With these assumptions, the nominal free
market price rises from $35/barrel during
1980-IV to about $54/barrel by 1985 and $80/
barrel by 1990 (Table 4). After-tax producer
prices thus range (depending on tier) from 55
to 84 percent of the uncontrolled price by
1985, and from 52 to 84 percent of the
uncontrolled price by 1990.
With these price estimates, and with Con-
gressional Budget Office estimates of produc-
tion under continued controls, we derive
(Scenario II and III) production estimates by
applying appropriate supply elasticities, just as
we did in estimating the effects of the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act. 29 The use of
nominal prices to estimate production losses is
justified by the use of the same inflation
adjustment for both controlled and
uncontrolled prices, so that inflation has a
neutral effect.
As seen in Table 5, domestic oil production
undoubtedly would have continued to trend
downward over the 1979-90 period under con-
tinued price controls. But all three sets of
Scenario I
assumed elasticities suggest that production is
likely to rise substantially between 1979 and
1985 under decontrol. The Congressional
Budget Office's forecast for production under
continued controls shows total production
dropping from 3,113 million barrels in 1979 to
2,748 million barrels by 1985, and then to
2,464 million barrels by 1990. Under the "low
response" set of elasticities, total production
with decontrol and no tax would reach 3,628
million barrels in 1985 and 3,248 million bar-
rels in 1990. With the tax, production could
still reach 3,255 million barrels in 1985 and
2,936 million barrels in 1990. Production
figures in the "high response" case would be
considerably higher, but as already indicated,
the elasticity figures involved appear to be
unrealistically high.
Here again, the production differentials be-
tween the scenarios would not necessarily
occur specifically in 1985 and 1990. Rather,
the differentials represent the ultimate produc-
tion responses to the estimated price differen-
tials existing in those years as a result of the
tax.
Domestic production probably would rise
Table 6: Estimated Domestic






































l Annual production in millions of barrels.
2 Medium response assumes an elasticity of.2 for tiers 1and 2, respectively, and also for heavy oil and incremental tertiary
oil in tier 3. It assumes an elasticity of .5 for newly discovered oil in tier 3.
22even faster than projected, under all three sets
of elasticity assumptions, if the uncontrolled
price rose at more than 2 percent above the
inflation rate (Table 6). For example, in the
medium-response situation, an increase from
2 percent to 5 percent in the real rate of oil-
price rise would mean an increase, from 53
percent to 66 percent, in the production
differential achieved by 1985 because of the
shift from controlled to uncontrolled prices.
With the windfall profit tax in effect, the pro-
duction differential would be 32 percent with a
2-percent real increase in prices, and 41 per-
cent with a 5-percent real rate of increase.
The higher prices being realized by pro-
ducers as a result of decontrol apparently are
now exerting a dramatic impact on exploration
and development activity. Drilling activity set
a new record in 1980, surpassing the previous
highs reached in the mid-1950's. During the
year, the industry drilled nearly 65,000 wells of
all types - about 26 percent more than during
1979. For the year, total footage drilled rose 23
percent, while the number of drilling rigs in
operation rose 32 percent. New records appear
in prospect for 1981.
Crude Oil Production, 1985,
Assumptionsl and with Medium Response2
Unfortunately, increased drilling activity has
not been translated into an increase in proved
crude-oil reserves. In 1979, total reserves con-
tinued a decline that began in 1968. But gross
additions to reserves amounted to 2.2 billion
barrels, the highest figure since 1971. This
meant a narrowing of the deficit between the
gross volume added to reserves and the
amount extracted. The inventory of proved
reserves dropped by only 0.8 billion barrels -
the smallest amount since 1968.
In any event, our analysis indicates that the
windfall-profit tax would reduce the produc-
tion response expected from decontrol. As a
measure to reduce dependence on foreign-oil
imports and improve the allocation of
resources, decontrol is a step in the right direc-
tion. But by the same token, the windfall-profit
tax is a step in the wrong direction. Perhaps
policymakers should alter the tax to make it a
true tax on profits rather than an excise tax on
a portion of the selling price. In that way, it
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, Production under this scenario depends upon the controlled price, and therefore is not influenced by alternative assump-
tions with regard to the decontrolled price.
4 Actual production losses under each price assumption are as follows: -2%, 411; 0%, 475; +2%, 557; +5%, 684;
+10%,908.
2324V. Summary and Conclusions
Federal price-control programs in effect
throughout most of the 1970's held the
average domestic producer price of crude oil
below the world market level. By permitting
refiners to pay less than the world price for
domestic crude, Congress attempted to protect
consumers from bearing the full impact of ris-
ing world prices. There is considerable debate
as to whether that objective was achieved.
Moreover, controls affected the supply side of
the u.s. market, both by creating greater de-
pendence on foreign oil and by leading to an
inefficient allocation of resources. In this
respect, the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act - as well as earlier control programs -
reduced domestic production substantially
below the level that would have prevailed
without controls.
Efficiency in satisfying any given level of
national consumption requires that domestic
producers expand crude-oil production to the
point where the cost of the last barrel equals
the cost of acquiring an additional barrel of
foreign crude. Federal controls violated that
condition, by holding the domestic selling
price below the landed price offoreign oil, and
thereby causing the industry to produce at less
than the optimum production level. For every
barrel not produced, the nation's dependence
on foreign oil rose by an equivalent amount at
a greater cost of resources.
The removal of price controls (January 28,
1981) has forced refiners to pay free-market
prices for domestic crude oil. That means
higher refined-product prices also, to the
extent that refiners pass on those higher costs
to consumers. But decontrol also should raise
domestic production above the level that
would prevail under continued controls. In
fact, decontrol may bring about at least a tem-
porary reversal in the production decline ofthe
past decade.
But the windfall-profit tax will reduce that
positive impact. For example, with supply
elasticities of .2 and .3 for existing and new
properties, respectively, and with a 2-percent
Appendix A
Windfall Profit Tax (WPT) Calculation, 19851
Tier III
Heavy All Other
Tier I Tier II Oil TIer III Oil
Estimated Decontrolled Price' 53.93 53.93 42.38 53.93
Less Adjusted 1979 Base Price' -19.92 -23.64 -28.23 -28.23
Windfall Profit Before Severance 34.01 30.29 14.15 25.70
Less Severance Tax' - 1.84 1.64 .76 - 1.39
Windfall Profit 32.17 28.65 13.39 24.31
Windfall Tax - 22.52 -1719 - 402 - 7.29
Amount ofWindfall Retained by Producers 9.65 11.46 9.37 17.02
Producer Realized Prices with Decontrol after WPT
Adjusted Base Price 19.92 23.64 28.23 28.23
Amount ofWindfall Retained by Producers + 965 + 11.46 + 9.37 +17.02
Producer Price with Decontrol after WPT 29.57 35.10 37.60 45.25
I All data in dollars per barrel.
, Price assumed to rise at the inflation rate plus 2 percent annually between 1980 and 1985.
1 Base price adjusted upward over the 1980-85 period according to the method described in the law.
, Tax imposed by the states, assumed 10 average 5.4 percent of the windfall profit before severance.
Source: All computations by aUlhor.
25real rate of price increase, decontrolled pro-
duction would be 31 percent higher in 1985,
and 30 percent higher in 1990, than the
amounts that might be produced with con-
tinued controls. But the windfall-profit tax
could reduce that production differential to
about 18 percent in 1985 and 1990 respec-
tively. And the more the decontrolled price of
oil rises relative to prices of other goods and
services, the greater will be the production
losses attributable to the tax.
FOOTNOTES
1, The term Ilproperty" is used as defined in the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act to mean a sepa-
rate and distinct producing reservoir. (U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, Monthly Energy Review, January
1981, p. 99). A "reservoir" is a porous and permeable
underground formation containing an individual and
separate natural accumulation of producible oil or of
oil and natural gas. In most situations, reservoirs are
classified as oil or gas reservoirs by a regulatory
agency. See American Petroleum Institute (1976, p.
7).
2. In this regard, crude-oil production differs from
most manufacturing processes. With the latter, we
assume that increasing capacity, (i.e., rate of attaina-
ble production), causes something like a proportio-
nate increase in the amount of product that ultimately
will be forthcoming. Crude-oil investments, however,
must be described with reference to two dimensions:
the rate of output to be achieved, and the total volume
of crude available for ultimate production. For a dis-
cussion of this point, see Bradley (1967, p. 16).
3. American Petroieum Institute, American Gas As-
sociation, Canadian Petroleum Association (1980, p.
14).
4. See, for example, Duchesneau (1975) and Eppen
(1975)
5. Herfindahl and Kneese (1974, p. 123).
6. This would be the average delivered price for
imported oil at the refinery gate, including transporta-
tion costs. In actuality, average domestic producer
prices probably would not exactly equal the average
landed cost of imported oil because of quality
differences. Crude oil is not a homogeneous com-
modity; viscosity, sulfur content and other charac-
teristics vary and affect its value. Nevertheless, the
price of imported oil would determine domestic prices
in the manner described in the text.
7. The requirements for efficiency on the supply and
demand sides of the U.S. crude-oil market, as well as
the inefficiencies created by price controls, are dis-
cussed in detail by Arrow and Kalt (1979, pp. 9-27).
Their work draws upon an earlier study by Roush
(1976).
8. For a detailed discussion of these state programs,
see McDonald (1971, pp. 29-55) and Bohi and
Russell (1978, pp. 250-253).
9. For a description of the various Federal crude-oil
price-control programs of the late 1970's, see
MacAvoy (1977) and Montgomery (1977 and 1978).
10. In computing the average target price, the energy
agency assigned stripper-well oil an upper-tier price
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rather than the price actually paid. That approach
made it possible to increase the price of stripper-well
oil without lowering the price of some other category
of domestic oil. See Montgomery (1977, pp. 9 and 12)
for a discussion of this point as well as the inflation
adjustment.
11. Economists generally agree that controls held
the average domestic producer selling price below
the world market level. Economists also agree that the
so-called entitlement program equalized the average
cost of crude oil to each refiner regardless of the rela-
tive amounts of imported, lower-tier, or upper-tier
imputs used - and that refiners paid a common
average price for all oil that was below the world
market level. See, for example, Cox and Wright (1978,
p. 4) and Montgomery (1977, p. 37). There is
widespread disagreement, however, about whether
crude-oil price controls reduced refined-product
prices below the level that would have prevailed with-
out controls. Montgomery has argued that the entitle-
ment program utilized competitive market forces to
pass through the increased refiners' profits from
price-controlled crude oil, from crude-oil producers to
refined product consumers (1977, pp. 37-40). Phelps
and Smith (1977) maintain that refined-product
prices were not held down by the controls and entitle-
ments, and profits were transferred from producers to
refiners. They argue that world refined products are
made from world crude. The U.S. imports refined pro-
ducts and therefore, U.S. refined product prices must
reflect world crude prices. This is basically an empiri-
cal question, but with much conflicing evidence. See,
for example, Deacon (1978).
12. The following analysis synthesizes an even more
detailed analysis of the production effects of the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, made by Kall
(1980, pp. 107-111). For an earlier discussion, see
Roush (1976, pp. 16-20).
13. There are also resources wasted on the demand
side as a a result of controls. The entitlement program
reduced the price of imported oil to a common
average price for domestic and imported oil (Pr) which
was below the world market price (Pw)' In doing so, it
raised the quantity of imported oil demanded above
the quantity that would have been demanded had
refiners been required to pay the world price for an
incremental barrel of crude. The additional oil
demanded had an incremental value to the economy
of Pro But to realize that value, the nation paid the
world price, Pw' to foreign sellers of crude. The
resources consequently wasted on the demand-side
equalled the difference between the world price and
the average refiner acquisition price for both foreign
and domestic oil, times the additional quantitydemanded as a result of the entitlement program. We
should note that the average refiner acquisition price
for domestic and imported oil, Pr, under the entitle-
ment program was between the world price, Pw' and
the average controlled domestic price, Pc as shown in
Chart 2. That price was not shown on the chart
because it did not affect the domestic production of
crude oil.
14. If marginal profit is increasing like compound
interest, an owner of a reservoir will be indifferent at
the margin between extracting and holding at every
instant of time. Hotelling (1931) established the
profit-maximizing condition for a firm managing a de-
pletable resource. For a further discussion of the
point see Solow (1974, pp. 1-6).
15. Kalt found that, on balance, controls tended "to
encourage later rather than earlier extraction." See
Kalt (1980, p. 132).
16. As indicated in footnote 11, some economists
argued that refined-product prices already reflected
world oil prices. They maintained that decontrolling
domestic crude-oil prices would have no effect on
refined-product prices.
17. This estimate was based on the assumption that
the uncontrolled domestic-producer price rose at the
inflation rate plus 2 percent - i.e., at a 2 percent real
annual rate - over the 1980-90 period. Reported in
"U.S. Windfall Tax Bonanza Based on $75 Oil Price in
1990" (1980, p. 3)
18. See assumption described in footnote 17.
19. The projected decline rate ("base level") is the
average daily amount of oil removed from the property
during the six-month period ended March 31, 1979,
reduced by one percent per month (after 1978) for
each month before the project-beginning date. See
Price Waterhouse and Company (1980, p. 21).
20. There would be no "windfall" upon which to base
the tax unless this condition prevailed.
21. Since controls were imposed on the selling price,
average selling prices of. lower- and upper-tier crude
in the absence of controls would have risen to
approximately the landed price for imported oil
(before entitlements). The uncontrolled wellhead
price would have roughly equalled the world price
minus the average transportation costs incurred by
domestic producers in supplying refiners. For
reasons of data availability we used actual and esti-
mated uncontrolled wellhead prices, rather than seIl-
ing prices, in calCUlating possible production losses
resulting from the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act.
22. In its 1979 Annual Report to Congress, the U.S.
Department of Energy forecast production for 1985
and 1990 under several categories that would cor-
respond to existing properties, the most responsive
being production from enhanced oil-recovery tech-
niques. The imputed price elasticity for existing pro-
perties derivable from these forecasts is approx-
imately.2.
23. That assumption was employed in most models
of reserve additions. See Bohi and Russell (1978, p.
237) for a discussion of this point.
24. For example, Fisher (1964) estimated an
eillsticity for new-oil discoveries of .3 using data for
1946-55, but Erickson and Spann (1971) obtained an
estimate of .8 using 1946-59 data. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy, in its 1979 Annual Report to Con-
gress, developed forecasts for 1985 and 1990 which
imply an elasticity for new fields of around .3. For a
survey of these and other models, see Kimmel (1977).
25. Estimates vary widely concerning the total
amount of oil remaining to be discovered in the United
States, both on and offshore. For example, one official
source places the total undiscovered recoverable
resource base at somewhere between 50 and 127
billion barrels; see U.S. Geological Survey (1975,
p. 4). Another recent assessment places the estimate
at between 14 and 32 billion barrels; see Nehring
(1981, p.175).
26. This is the same price assumption employed by
the Joint Committee on Taxation in developing its
1979 estimates of the Federal revenues to be derived
from the windfall-profit tax. The price assumption is
used to analyze the production effects of decontrol,
with and without the windfall-profit tax. Note that
there would be no tax unless the uncontrolled
domestic price remains above the adjusted base
price.
27. Tier 3 encompases newly discovered oil, heavy
oil and incremental tertiary oil. It receives preferential
treatment in the law through a lower tax rate and an
extra 2-percent annual increase in its base-adjusted
price.
28. Their estimate, made in early 1979, underesti-
mated the actual increase in uncontrolled prices that
actually occurred by the latter part of that year.
29. For estimates of production under continued
controls, see U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget
Office (1979, p. 76).
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